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Auctions are common mechanisms for identifying prices and suppliers of commodities and are
particularly important in agricultural marketing.  Information asymmetries among bidders may be
ameliorated over time through some form of learning.  In this study, we incorporate prior decisions to
participate, information from previous auctions, and firm-specific attributes to explain both the decision
to bid and the level of the bid.  Our analysis uses data from Egyptian oilseed tenders, an important market
both for oilseeds and tendering.  Because of the unbalanced nature of the panel data, we are able to
evaluate the effects of signals received from previous tenders.  We find that firms learn from previous
auctions and can gain an informational advantage through some form of representation (e.g., by having an
agent and/or direct sales agent to the country).  Our results provide strong evidence that learning-by-doing
affects the decision to participate and that learning affects the bid value.  We also find that firms use
outcomes of previous auctions to update information in both their decisions to participate in a market as
well as determining the bid level.  Finally, we find that firms with representation have a higher probability
of participating in auctions and some evidence that they submit higher bids (earning higher returns). 
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1In the case of grains there are numerous examples of auctions playing an integral role in marketing.  These
include not only import tendering as described in this study, but also auctions for EEP allocations, for rail rates and
service (Wilson, Priewe, and Dahl), and import tendering for barley in Japan (Rampton).  Auctions were also
proposed and adopted as an alternative in Canadian grain marketing (Estey and Kroeger).
PARTICIPATION AND LEARNING IN AUCTIONS:   
BIDDING DECISIONS IN EGYPTIAN OILSEED AUCTIONS
William W. Wilson and Wesley W. Wilson
*
INTRODUCTION
Auctions and bidding play an important role in agricultural marketing.  A popular and
noteworthy use of auctions (or what is now commonly referred to as reverse auctions) is that of
import tendering which is used for both price determination and allocation of purchases among
sellers.  In fact, an important form of inter-firm and inter-country rivalry involves bidding
strategies.  Specifically, buyers use auctions extensively in the procurement of agricultural
products to identify the low-cost supplier and to promote competition among rivals.  Given that
costs vary randomly through time, across competitors, and cannot be directly observed by
buyers, auctions are an efficient way to identify the low-cost suppliers.  For these reasons,
auctions have traditionally been and continue to be an important mechanism affecting
competition in this industry.
1
Information is a crucial element in determining bids among competitors in bidding
games.  Firms with more refined information enjoy a competitive advantage.  Though the
structure of the world grain and oilseeds industries have been the subject of numerous studies,
there has been limited attention to bidding strategies which is an integral element of firm
conduct.  Some of that literature has focused on the role of information which is touted as an
important element in understanding the sources of economies and competitive advantage among2
grain and oilseed firms.  Caves identified information as a crucial source of competitive
advantage in commodity-based businesses.  Cook suggested that the exporting industry would
likely evolve to include two strategic groups, one being physical asset intensive the other more
informational intensive.  This has in fact been evolving.  During much of the period from the
1970s through the 1980s, grain trading firms sought to develop competitive advantage based on
their information networks.  Information has important characteristics which influence conduct. 
Most important is that it involves a high fixed cost, thus yielding substantial economies, and that
it is perishable.  Some grain trading firms have pursued strategies to build extensive overseas
networks through direct representation, agents, or vertical integration.  In each case, information
procurement is an important element motivating these strategies.  However, how information
affects conduct and, in this case bidding strategies, are not well understood.  
There is an extensive literature on auctions and bidding.  Cassady provides a historical
overview of auction strategies and mechanisms.  More recently, several bibliographies (McAffee
and McMillan (1987, 1996b); Engelbrecht-Wiggans; Milgrom (1985, 1987 and 1989) and
Rothkopf and Harstad) review the literature on auctions and bidding strategies. Recent texts
(including Monroe, Nagle and Holden; and Lilien and Kotler (1992); Rasmusen; Kottas and
Khumawata and Sewall) provide some practical motivations for auctions and analytical
approaches to bidding strategies.  There have been several recent studies on empirical auctions. 
Examples include Brown, Hausch and Li; Crampton (1995);   Hendricks and Porter; Hendricks,
Porter and Wilson; Hughart; McMillan (1997); McAfee and McMillan (1986, 1996a, 1996b);
Oren and Rothkopf; Reece; and Wilson (1988 and 1992).  Recent examples in agriculture
include Bourgeon and LeRoux (1996a, 1996b and 2001) for EU export tenders and Latacz-3
Lohmamm and Hamsvoort for the Conservation Reserve Program, and Hayes et al. and to
determine demands for new goods (Shogren, List, and Hayes).  
Several studies have analyzed some specific issues identified as important in this study
using results from experimental auctions.  Battalio et al. (1990) analyzed the impact of the
number of bidders on strategies in first price sealed bid auctions.  Dyer et al. (1989) examined
how bidders respond to uncertainties about competitor bids.  McAfee and McMillan (1987)
illustrate that bids are impacted by the number of bidders, and that better informed bidders earn
greater returns in common value auctions.  Finally, attention has been given to the winner’s
curse (e.g., Coy and Thaler) and appropriate strategies to avoid its impact (R. Wilson 1987). 
Lesser attention has focused on factors affecting bidding strategies in real auctions.  A
notable exception is Porter and Zona who studied bidding strategies in milk procurement.  In a
reverse auction, sellers have two fundamental and potentially related decisions.  These include
whether to bid, and if so, how much to bid.  Taken together, we refer to these as components of a
bidding strategy.  These are potentially impacted by numerous influences among which include
expected costs and perceptions of the intensity of competition.  In addition to these,  the role and
impact of “learning” or experience, as well as other idiosyncratic firm characteristics impact
bidding strategies.  Learning can occur through participation in past auctions as well as through
information on the results of the preceding auction.  These provide potential informational and
cost advantages for some, but not all firms, and result in important asymmetries among firms.   
The purpose of this study is to assess how these factors impact bidding strategies.  The
results are particularly useful in understanding sellers’ strategies regarding participation in
bidding as well as determination of bid levels. Detailed data were from sunoil tenders by an
Egyptian import agency.  The results indicate that participation decisions are independent of bid4
level decisions, that there are unobserved and asymmetric firm effects which impact participation
decisions,  and that learning and information from previous auctions have  important impacts on
bidding strategies. The next section describes our empirical models of bidding strategies.  The
following section presents the statistical analysis of bidding strategies.  The final section
provides a summary, some conclusions, and implications. 
ANALYTICAL MODELS OF BIDDING STRATEGIES
Our analysis focuses on two key decisions.  Suppliers maximize expected profits by
choosing to participate in an auction, and, if they do, the bid level.  We first describe the optimal
bid and then the choice of whether the firm participates or not.
Given the firm participates, we assume they choose to maximize the expected payoff
E(B) which is 
(1)
where B is the bid,   is the lowest bid amongst rival bidders, C is marginal cost, k is the sunk
cost of bidding and participation in the market (with or without representation) and prob(B< ) is
the probability of winning which we will denote below as PN(W).
 To win, a bidder must dominate all other bidders.  The probability of underbidding each
specific opponent across a range of potential bids is  the joint probability of underbidding all
opponents.  With N independent bidders, the probability firm i wins is: 
(2)5
where Pi(W) is the joint probability of underbidding all opponents, and Pij(W) is the probability
of a bidder i winning against competitor j. 
Firms do not participate in every tender.  We follow Simon and Nagle and Holden and
treat the number of bidders as uncertain.  The probability of winning against a random bidder is 
P'i (W) = pjc@Pi(W) + (1-pjc) where  pjc is the probability that competitor j bids, Pi(W) is the
probability of winning, and (1-pjc) is the probability that competitor j does not bid.
The optimal bid, which maximizes expected profits is defined as
(3)
The optimal bid (B*) is the bid that solves the associated first-order condition given by:
(4)
Solving 4 for the optimal bid yields 
(5)
There is a fundamental tradeoff in determining the optimal bid.  Higher bids result in a greater
payoff, but, a lower probability of winning.  The product of these two functions yields E(B), the
maximum of which is the optimal bid.  Deviations from this affect both the probability of
winning and the payoff, and would result in a lower E(B).  The optimal bid (B*) is affected by
costs and the relationship between the probability of winning and the bid.  As the number of
bidders increases (or the participation rate of bidders increases),  Pi (W) decreases resulting in
lower expected payoffs from bidding and reduced bids (B*).    6
Theoretically, the sunk cost of bidding (k) does not have a direct impact on the optimal
bid but may have an indirect effect.  k represents sunk costs associated with participating in a
market and bidding (i.e., cost of representation and bid preparation costs).  It is possible the
bidder is influenced by these sunk costs.  Simon (p. 279) observes that the greater the value of k,
the greater is the pressure to participate and psychological incentive to win by lowering bids.  
Substitution of B* into equation 1 yields the maximum expected payoff from bidding –
the bidding payoff (B
B).  However, it may not always be optimal to bid.  That is, sales in an
alternative market may be preferable.  In this case, firms can participate in a spot market the
value of which is interpreted as the opportunity cost of bidding in a tender. The payoffs from the
alternative is B
A.  A condition for participation in the tender is that expected payoffs from
participation must be at least as large as the payoffs from the alternative, i.e., E(B
B )$E(B
A).  As
prices in the spot market (the alternative market) increase, the likelihood of participation in the
tender decreases.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
We specify two empirical models about firm bidding strategies which follow directly
from above.  We model whether or not a firm bids,  the participation decision, and the value of 
bid submitted conditional on participating.  We first describe our model of participation and then
the bidding model conditioned on participation.
Tender Participation Decisions7
The participation decision follows from the condition that to participate in the auction
expected returns exceed returns from the outside alternative, i.e., E(B
B )$E(B
A.).  We observe
whether a bid is submitted, i.e., *=1, if E(B
B) >E(B
A). We use the index function approach to
modeling participation.  The empirical model is:
(6)
where P(.) is a probability function, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, and $ is a set of
unknown parameters.
Expected payoffs from participation depend on the bid value, the likelihood of winning,
and costs of participation, while payoffs from non-participation depend on the price from an
outside option ( i.e., opportunity cost in the alternative market).  Most of these variables are not
directly observable and are, questionably, endogenous.  To avoid these complications, we model
the difference between expected payoffs from participation and non-participation as a reduced
form and estimate the decision as a logit model.  
As explanatory variables, we include the price of the outside option as well as a set of
firm specific characteristics.  We expect the price of the outside option (P
A) to have a negative
effect on the probability of participation.  We include variables representing firm specific
characteristics to reflect effects of learning, representation, unobserved firm characteristics and
participation in previous tenders. 
 “Learning by doing” is important in business strategy (Oster 1994) and has become
subject of a growing literature both theoretically and empirically [(Lieberman 1984), (Gruber
1992), (Dick 1994), (Irwin and Klenow 1994), (Jarmin 1994), and (Brist and Wilson 1996)]. 
Generally, this literature holds that firms reduce costs through experience or learning-by-doing. 8
In particular, unit costs are allegedly impacted by cumulative output.  Typically, cumulative
output has an asymptotic impact on unit costs, with greater reductions in earlier periods, tapering
off as experience increases.  Each of these studies capture these effects through a learning-by-
doing variable which is the firm’s cumulative production over time.  As firms learn through
previous production decisions, costs fall.  In our case, we use the cumulative sum of decisions to
participate as a measure of the costs of information gathering and participating in the market.  In
both cases, we expect costs to fall with experience making participation decisions more likely. 
The impact of learning by doing is that firms’ unit costs decline through learning.  These
impacts are prospectively fairly important, particularly in commodity type industries.  Lieberman
showed that the learning curve effect may overshadow scale economies in petrochemicals. 
There are at least three sources of learning.  First, economies of distribution decline as the
cumulative number of trades increases (e.g., the prospect of combining shipments from multiple
transactions results in lower shipping costs).  Second,  participaton in auctions require the
formation of expected bids.  The costs of gaining information to formulate bids and the sunk
costs of participation likely fall with market experiences.  These would be represented by k>0 in
the theoretical model.  Third,  through experience firms likely gain knowledge of
competitiveness of bids and the profitability of operating in the market.
We examine several measures of learning.  Following directly from previous literature,
we use a measure defined as the cumulative sum of participation decisions made by a particular
firm.  At time period t, a firm’s experience would be the number of times through period t-1, in
which the firm has participated in the market.  To reflect diminishing returns, we define our








learning variable as an inverse measure.  Increases in the  cumulative sum of participation
decreases our learning measure, and the likelihood of participation increases.  We expect the sign
on the coefficient to be negative.  This measure has the advantage of introducing a non-linearity
that allows the effectiveness of learning to dissipate.  
We also examine the effects of  learning with two other variables.  Specifically, we use
lagged values of participation as explanatory variables.  Learning may depend not just on past
participation (the sum of which is equivalent whether the sum is collected in the distant past or
the near past), but also the period of time in which learning occurs.  An alternative measure of
learning is a distributed lag of past participation rates.  Empirically, we use L1 and L2 which
represent lagged values of participation in the previous one and two tenders, respectively.  We
expect the coefficients on each of these two variables to positively influence participation, and
for the coefficients to become smaller with the length of a lag, i.e., the effect of being in the
auction last period is greater than the effect of being in the auction two periods before.
We include two other explanatory variables.  First, the 20 firms are largely multinational
firms that supply or potentially supply the market.  All supply is done through exportation and
not through foreign direct investment.  Seven of the firms have representation in Egypt.  To
reflect this greater commitment, we incorporate a dummy variable (R) taking a value of one if
the firm has a representation office and a value of zero otherwise.  Our conjecture is that if a firm
has representation they are more likely to participate in the auction market.  Indirectly, these are
sunk costs related to participating in a market and would have an impact on the value of k. 
Though this does not directly impact the optimal bid price, it may have an indirect impact due to
informational advantages.2We examined the potential bias from sample selection and found no evidence that the decision to
participate in a tender is correlated with the level of the bid (i.e., there is no significant sample selection bias). 
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Our data are repeated observations on tenders, and firms observe the outcome from
previous tenders.  Information gained from previous auctions has the potential to affect
participation and bidding behavior.  We include another set of variables that reflect results of
previous auctions.  We examine two measures including the price of the outside option divided
by the average bid in the previous tender (P
 A
i / ¯ B)t-1 ,  and the price of the outside option divided
by the winning bid in the previous tender (P
 A
i / B
W) t-1 .  As a set of final explanatory variables,
we included a set of firm-specific effects.  These dummy variables are included to control for
unobserved and systematic effects specific to a firm but unobserved in our data.  
In the most general form, the specifications we examine are special cases of:
(7)
where the price of the alternative and the bid in the previous time period can take on different 
measures as described above.
Bid Level Decisions 
Our model of bidding behavior follows directly from the previous sections.  The base
model includes, the price of the outside option, information from the previous auction, and firm
specific characteristics (representation, learning and firm dummy variables).
2  The estimated
model is:  
(8)3However, we also estimated the model with U.S. Gulf prices and the results, while numerically different,
do not lead to different qualitative conclusions.
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We use the Rotterdam price as the price of the outside option.  Rotterdam is a highly
transparent and readily tradeable market and consequently is included as a measure of the
outside alternative for the procurement agency.  It is with this price that sellers must compete. 
We expect then that bids submitted must dominate the Rotterdam price, and as we discuss later,
the Rotterdam price is highly correlated with bids.  Discussions with market analysts along with
this conjecture suggest that the Rotterdam price is the appropriate measure explaining bid. 
3 
We also allow signals from previous tenders to enter the model.  We ultimately used the
winning bid in the previous tender, B
W
t-1.  We experimented with alternative forms of updating
such as the ratio of the bid submitted and the winning bid from the last tender in which the firm
participated, the ratio of the outside option price and the winning bid from the last tender.  The
results reported dominate but do not differ qualitatively.  
Learning and representation captures the same effects as discussed earlier.  We explore
two different functional forms -- a linear and a log form.  In the linear specification, learning is
measured as described above, the inverse measure of learning, while in the log specifications we








on bidding that are not observed by the inclusion of fixed effects (FE).
DATA DESCRIPTION
A data set was developed from bids received during tenders by the Egyptian procurement
agency responsible for importing vegetables oils.  Tenders were generally held monthly at about12
the same time each month and asked for bids for sunoil.  The time period for the analysis
presented here cover all tenders from January 1990 through August 1993.  Suppliers are
exporting firms, some being both the processor and exporter, others being processors’ agents. 
Sometimes suppliers make multiple offers at different bids (i.e., scaled bids) which is a common
practice in international tendering.  We treated these as separate offers by that particular
supplier. 
For each tender, the agency identifies minimum and maximum quantities that will be
purchased.  Firms then choose whether to bid.  In some tenders, the agency selects more than one
winning bid.  In short, the result is that there are unequal numbers of bidders across tenders,
multiple bids submitted by individual firms, and, perhaps, multiple winning bids.  We consider
each in turn.
Over the three-year period 20 different firms submitted bids in 26 tenders. The number of
firms submitting bids or suppliers, varied over time.  For each tender, the number of bidders and
the number of total bids varied because the number of bids each supplier submitted varied.   The
number of bids exceeds the number of bidders because of multiple bids.  The number of firms
participating ranged from 2 to 11 with an average of 7.7 firms per tender.  If the firm chooses to
bid, it submits one or more bids each consisting of a price and quantity to be delivered. 
Frequently firms submit multiple bids.  The result of this process is that there are unequal
numbers of bidders across tenders, multiple bids submitted by individual firms, and, perhaps,
multiple winning bids. 
Oilseed prices were taken from Oilworld Annual Reports and were concurrent with the
date of the tender.  Finally, firm representation was derived through interviews with major
importers in this market. 4The world price variable is constant across firms for each tender.  Inclusion of both tender and world price
results in a singular hessian matrix.
13
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical specifications have variables with several measurements and estimation
alternatives.  First, we tested for selection bias in the bidding equations.  In no case
(specification) did we find significance i.e., the participation models and the bidding models can
be estimated separately without bias.  We then proceeded through each of the specification
issues and report models with and without firm specific effects and with alternative
measurements and functional forms.  We first describe the participation decision results and then
results of the bid level models.
Participation Decisions
The results are presented in Table 1 with several different models with and without
controls for firm heterogeneity.   We first estimate a model with an intercept and world price
(model 1). We then introduce firm intercepts (model 2) and firm interactions (model 3).  In the
final model, we replace world price with tender dummies (model 4).
4   Heterogeneity across
firms was controlled using firm specific dummy variables.  Owing to the representation variable,
there are two base dummies.  Results are based on a reduced set of firm dummies.  Results are
based on a reduced set of firm dummies.  Comparable results for the full set of firm dummies are14




a 123 45 6
Constant 1.619 2.573** 2.402 1.911 4.844** 4.332*
(1.273) (1.467) (1.369) (1.525) (1.740) (1.960)
P
A -.003 -0.005** NA NA NA NA
(0.002) (0.003) NA NA NA NA
(P
 A
i / ¯ B)t-1 NA NA -2.051** -2.451** NA NA




W)t-1 NA NA NA NA -4.141* -4.629*
NA NA NA NA (1.452) (1.644)
Reprei 1.006* -0.234 1.031* 0.899* 1.075* 1.233*
(0.204) (0.334) (0.215) (0.317) (0.230) (0.314) 
Learnit -1.983* -0.396 -2.711* -1.961* -2.706* -1.847*
(0.311) (0.411) (0.387) (0.427) (0.425) (0.463)
%Correct
a l l6 97 67 1 8 07 2 8 0
In=1 47 60 48 64 55 65
In=0 84 87 83 89 82 89
Chi-Square 94 219 117 211 104 198
Fixed Effects No Yes* No Yes* No Yes*
N
b 520 520 500 500 440 440
a * and ** represent statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
  
b Specifications 1 and 2 reflect all the data; Specifications 3 and 4 require the omission of the
first tender, consisting of 20 firms, Specifications 5 and 6 require the omission of tenders 1, 4, 6,
and 16 due to the fact that winning bids were not available for tenders 3, 5 and 15, and tender 1





a 7 8 9 10 11 12
Constant -0.442 0.585 -0.710 0.104 -0.599 0.135
(1.922) (2.001) (2.090) (2.167) (2.139) (2.221)
P
A -0.004 -0.005 NA NA NA NA
(0.003) (0.0036) NA NA NA NA
(P
 A
i / ¯ B)t-1 NA NA -1.566 -2.358 NA NA




W)t-1 NA NA NA NA -1.634 -2.482
NA NA NA NA (1.793) (1.868)
Reprei 0.764* 0.741* 0.771* 0.753* 0.772* 0.985*
(0.290) (0.350) (0.290) (0.351) (0.290) (0.368)
Learn1ti 2.520* 2.127* 2.511* 2.113* 2.513* 2.056*
(0.312) (0.332) (0.312) (0.332) (0.312) (0.336)
Learn2ti 1.183* 0.877* 1.175* 0.859* 1.172*
0.783*
(0.312) (0.333) (0.313) (0.335) (0.313) (0.340)
% Correct
A l l 8 48 68 4 8 68 4 8 7
In=1 78 81 72 81 88 81
In=0 88 89 88 89 78 90
Chi-Square 223 250 223 250 223 250
Fixed Eff. No Yes* No Yes* No Yes*
N
b 420 420 420 420 420 420
a * and ** represent statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
  
b Specifications 7, 8, 9, and 10 reflect all tenders except tenders 1 and 2.  Specifications 11 and
12 do not include tenders 1 and 2, and 4, 6, and 16 due to the fact that winning bids were not
available for tenders 3, 5 and 15, and tenders1 and 2 due to the lags on the learning variables.5The subset of firm dummies included in the specifications in table 1 were chosen through inspection and
statistics, factoring in the robustness of the results along with the statistical import of the firm dummies.  The subset
varies across specification owing to differences in included observations i.e., tenders 4, 6 and 16 could not be
included since in tender 3, 5, and 15 no winning bid was reported.  Also, some specifications required lags outside of
the sample range.  The affected observations were omitted.  
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in the Appendix.
5   Specifications 1, 3 and 5 use the hyperbolic learning index and vary across
the treatment of prices.  Specifications, 2, 4, and 6 mirror 1, 3, and 5 but include fixed effects. 
Specifications 7, 9, and 11 use lagged participation decisions to reflect the learning process
and/or the stickiness in participation decisions.  Specifications 8, 10, and 12 mirror those of 7, 9,
11 but include fixed effects.
All models are highly significant with chi-square statistics well in excess of critical
values.  All specifications do reasonably well in terms of overall classification rates, and in all
cases, the models do a much better job of classifying firms that do not participate than firms that
do participate.  As might be expected, incorporation of firm specific effects helps to ameliorate
this result but does not remove it.  Finally, in all cases, firm specific dummies are jointly
significant.  Comparison of models with and without fixed effects suggest that the inclusion does
not have a large impact on the outside option variable and dampens the effect of learning. 
However, inclusion does not remove the effect.  These results confirm that firms are
heterogenous in participation decisions.  
 The effect of representation is mixed.  Only in specification 2 does the inclusion of fixed
effects affect the statistical significance of the result.   The price variables are of the correct sign
[where included].  As the outside option becomes more attractive, firms are less likely to
participate in the auction market.  In all specifications containing our cumulative learning index
(1-6) except specification 1, the variables reflecting outside options are statistically significant at6These qualitative effects are consistent with the models containing the full set of dummies reported in the
Appendix (table A-1).
7Such occurrences are not observed in the data but are presented to simply note a difficulty with the
measure.
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the 10 percent level.  The exchange of the cumulative learning index with the lags of
participation decisions, results in all price terms becoming statistically insignificant.
6
Firms with representation are interpreted as having better information and/or reduced
costs of executing trades, and as a result, are more likely to participate in the market.  Having
representation does not necessarily mean that the firm will participate in the market.  In all
specifications except specification 2, the effect of representation is highly significant in
statistical terms, and, as we discuss below, the effect is substantial in economic terms. 
Past participation in tenders appear to be a driving force in current participation
decisions, reflecting the effects of learning.  Our conjecture is that the effects of past
participation are the result of familiarity with the market and, therefore, reflects learning and the
costs associated with gaining familiarity in the market.  In all cases, the coefficients have the
correct sign suggesting that participation decisions are more likely with past decisions than
without.  In all specifications except specification 2, the coefficients on learning are statistically
significant at the five percent level.  Finally, consistent with the definition of the learning index
in specifications 1-6 and consistent with the econometric results in specifications 7-12, the
effects of learning dissipate.  In specifications 1-6, the reciprocal of the cumulative sum forces
the result and the effect of five past participation decisions lagged 10 periods (and none for the
last 10 periods) is the same as the effect of five participation decisions in the last five periods.
7 
In contrast, the lagged participation decisions in specifications 7-12 clearly indicates that the
effect is much stronger for t-1 than t-2, suggesting that recent experience has the largest effect.8Of the specifications 1-6, specification 6 has the highest classification rate and seems to be better rooted in
theory.  Firms choose to participate based on expected profit if they win.  The lagged price divided by the average
winning bid seems to us as a better signal than the lagged  price divided by the average bid.  Regardless, the plots of
the latter are quite comparable to those of the former, and do not materially affect the discussion.  In specifications 6-
12, the effect of outside options is not statistically significant.  It may be that the lagged participation decisions
contain part of the effect of outside options and mask the effect.
18
To illustrate the economic effects of the models, we present plots of probabilities against
relevant variables, consisting of an outside option variable and a learning variable .  In both
cases, we use the coefficient estimates from specification 6.
8  The plots are based on average
sample values for the other continuous variables and for firms with and without representation. 
Finally, we use the base firm results, i.e., all firm specific dummies are set to zero.  
There are a number of striking results in Figure 1.  First, the effect of the outside option is
quite large.  The outside option has a range of about 130 percent.  Over this range, the
probability of participation for a firm with representation falls from about .61 to about .28.  For
firms without representation, the probability falls from about .32 to about .10.  Further, the range
of values of the outside option (as indicated by the marks)  is reasonably balanced, suggesting
that price changes can and do materially affect participation from one tender to the next.  The
effect of representation is quite large with firms having representation being about twice or more
likely to participate. 
   Figure 2 illustrates the effect of experience.  The range of the data is quite large with
firms that have no experience (none have experience in tender 2) to firms that participate in 25 of
the 26 tenders.  For all firms, the effects of cumulative experience are quite large. The




































































































































with no experience and no representation, the simulated probability is about .05 and increases up
to about .22 as experience increases – a more than fourfold increase.  For firms with no
experience but with representation, the simulated probability increases from about .15 to more
than .50 - a more than threefold increase.  Most of the effect is reached within five or six tenders,
suggesting a relatively fast learning rate.  Over that time frame, learning occurs much faster for
firms with representation than without.  Finally, firms with representation are more likely to
participate in a tender than those without.  This effect runs from firms with representation being
two to three times more likely to participate.
Bid Levels
We present results from several models explaining bid values.  In all cases, there was no
evidence of sample selection bias.  That is, the unobserved variables in the participation decision
do not seem to have a significant effect on bid levels.  We present eight specifications in Tables
2 and 3  for the linear and double-log specifications, respectively.  Models with no firm effects
are shown in columns 1, 3, 5 and 7, while corresponding models with firm effects are shown in
columns 2, 4, 6, and 8.  
In all cases, inclusion of firm effects, representing unobserved and systematic differences
across firms, is significant.  In model 1, we estimate bids as a function of the outside option (the
Rotterdam spot price).  In models 3, 4, 7, and 8, we include information from the previous tender
– the average winning bid.  Inclusion of this variable simply reflects updating that may occur

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ratio of the bid submitted and the winning bid from the last tender in which the firm participated,
the ratio of the price and the winning bid from the last tender.  The results reported dominate but
(1/(1+cumulative participation decisions)) while in the log specifications we measure learning as
(cumulative+cumulative participation decisions).
  The fit of the models are quite high with R
2's ranging from  .89 to .92.  Comparisons of
non-fixed effects specifications (1, 3, 5, 7) and fixed effect specifications (2, 4, 6, and 8) suggest
that the addition of firm specific dummies increases only modestly the fit of the equations and
affects the qualitative results only with respect to whether the firm has representation  – the
coefficient on Representation changes from negative and significant to insignificant with the
addition of fixed effects.
Results suggest that the outside option is important.  In almost all specifications the
coefficient  is less than one.  The results are clear.  If firms choose to participate, they submit
bids which are competitive with the outside option, regardless of specification.  The addition of
the results from the last period auction improves fit modestly and is always statistically
significant.  Firms apparently observe the outcome
from the last tender and adjust their bids
accordingly.  If, in the previous tender the winning bid is high, firms increase their bids.  The
magnitude is, perhaps, best judged from the double log specifications.  If B
W
t-1 increases by 10
percent, the bid submitted increases by about 1 percent. 
Coefficients on firm representation are mixed and sensitive to inclusion of fixed effects. 
Inclusion of fixed effects are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  It appears that firms25
with representation tend to submit lower bids, ceteris paribus, but the lower bids are captured in
the fixed effects and representation itself has no effect.  
The findings with respect to learning are also mixed but only in terms of statistical
significance.  The results indicate that learning has either no influence (model 5 and 6) or a
positive influence on bids (models 7 and 8).  This likely indicates that firms with experience
would shade their bids upwards, in part to avoid the winner’s curse.  In the linear specification,
learning is measured as a hyperbolic function of past participation decisions.  As a result it is an
inverse measure where increased experience leads to a positive effect on the bid value.  In all
specifications, the effect is reasonably small.  For example, using model 8 in the linear
specification (the largest linear effect), an increase in experience from 9 to 10 tenders, increases
the bid [(-10.614)(-1)/(1+9)
2]=$1.1/mt.  Results are comparable in the double log specification: a
10 percent increase in experience increases the bid by only .08 percent.
The effects within a given tender can be quite large.  The range of results in the data is
from zero to 24 tenders.  In Figure 3, we plot the range of bid estimates for both the log and
linear specifications (model 8, in both cases).  While there are some differences across
specification, some clear results emanate.  First, the range of bids submitted by inexperienced
bidders and experienced bidders is quite high, about $15 per ton.  Second, while learning occurs
throughout,  most learning is complete after about five tenders (in the linear specifications). 
Apparently, with experience firms obtain some of the rents accruing to tender markets, while



















































































































































 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Reverse auctions are used extensively in agricultural marketing as procurement
mechanisms.  These age-old mechanisms have become revered in recent years as a result of
information technology changes as well as the competitive environment among buyers and
sellers.  Reverse auctions are especially important and an interesting aspect of grain and oilseed
importing where buyers use tenders to price their purchases, and determine suppliers for
individual transactions.   Understanding bidding strategies used by firms involved in auctions is
critical to understanding the microstructure of competition in this sector and have important
implications for buyers and sellers.
This paper developed models to analyze bidding strategies by international trading firms.
There are two salient components of bidding strategies.  One is the decision of whether to bid,
and the other is how much to bid.  These decisions are impacted by a multitude of factors. 
However, those of particular interest include the role and effects of learning, information and
idiosyncratic firm characteristics.  
 There are a number of interesting results.  Participation decisions are largely affected by
information from previous tenders, learning and individual firm characteristics.  Results from the
previous tender have a positive impact on participation.  High relative bids reflected in previous
tenders induces greater participation.  The learning curve effect is highly significant suggesting
that firms have a tendency to learn from participating in previous tenders.  This has a cumulative
and nonlinear effect.  Intuitively, these results suggest that learning has the effect of reducing
unit costs as participation increases and most of the gains being achieved from the most recent
experiences.  This would imply that the expected payoff increases and as such greater28
cumulative participation has a positive impact on whether to bid.  Another interesting variable is
whether firms have representation in the importing country.  In this case having representation
nearly doubles the probability of bidding. 
Bid value decisions are affected by the outside option (i.e., the alternative market), results
from previous tenders and whether the firm has representation in the importing country.  In
addition, the effect of learning dissipates through time, seems to be important and has a positive
impact on bid levels.  The latter suggests experienced firms shade their bids upwards to mitigate
impacts of the winner’s curse.  Finally, bidding strategies are highly predictable using readily
available information.  It appears the decisions to bid are independent of the decision on how
much to bid. 
These results have important implications for auction participants.  The general goal of
the buyer should be to increase the number of suppliers, their frequency of bidding and to keep
them symmetrically informed.  Though the buyer in this study has many suppliers, a notable
aspect of competition is that their participation is quite random.  Only a few are routinely
involved in tenders. As a result, suppliers are likely not symmetric with respect to costs, or
information.  Consequently, one would expect a tendency for some to win more frequently than
others.  These results suggest there are two obvious implications for sellers. One is that
expectations of rivals’ bidding strategies, which are essential in determining own strategies, are
predictable and should be explored.  Second, both representation and experience enhances
success in markets using these types of mechanisms. 
This paper provides several contributions to the evolving literature on the empirical
analysis of bidding strategies and auctions.  It provides an understanding of the microstructure of29
firm conduct in industries dominated by bidding competition.  Second, is the role and effect of
learning in industries in which bidding is an integral pricing mechanism.  The learning, or
experience, curve effect has been an important foundation for business strategy, and has recently
become the subject of empirical analysis.  These results indicate that learning has very important
impacts on the formulation of firms’ bidding strategy which is consistent with other studies’
findings that better informed bidders earn greater returns.      30
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Constant 1.619 2.736** 2.402 2.142 4.844** 4.640*
(1.273) (1.511) (1.369) (1.559) (1.740) (2.017)
P
A -.003 -0.005** NA NA NA NA
(0.002) (0.003) NA NA NA NA
(P
 A
i / ¯ B)t-1 NA NA -2.051** -2.475** NANA




W)t-1 NA NA NA NA
-4.141* -4.672**
NA NA NA NA (1.452) (1.669)
Learnit -1.983* -0.37 -2.711* -1.797* -2.706*
-1.737*
(0.311) (0.433) (0.387) (0.510) (0.425) (0.570)
Reprei 1.006* -0.52 1.031* 0.869 1.075* 0.927
(0.204) (0.605) (0.215) (0.577) (0.230) (0.619)
% Correct
a l l 6 97 77 17 97 28 1
In=1 47 65 48 66 55 67
In=0 84 84 83 87 82 89
Chi-Square 94 221 117 219 104 205
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
N
c 520 520 500 500 440 440
a * and ** represent statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
  
b Specifications 1 and 2 reflect all the data; Specifications 3 and 4 require the omission of the
first tender, consisting of 20 firms, Specifications 5 and 6 require the omission of tenders 1, 4, 6,
and 16 due to the fact that winning bids were not available for tenders 3, 5 and 15, and tender 1





a 7891 0 1 1 1 2
Constant -1.095 -0.438 -2.424 -1.432 -0.599 0.747
(1.684) (1.839) (1.700) (1.826) (2.139) (2.287)
P
A -0.002 -0.003 NA NA NA NA
(0.003) (0.003) NA NA NA NA
(P
 A
i / ¯ B)t-1 NA NA -0.058 -0.734 NA NA




W)t-1 NA NA NA NA -1.634 -2.632
NA NA NA NA (1.793) (1.891)
Repreti 0.735* 0.400 0.741* 0.441 0.772* 0.595
(0.270) (0.675) (0.269) (0.667) (0.290) (0.713)
Learn1ti 2.298* 1.874* 2.299* 1.869* 2.513* 2.005*
(0.285) (0.305) (0.284) (0.306) (0.312) (0.340)
Learn2ti 1.460* 1.039* 1.457* 1.033* 1.172* 0.704*
(0.285) (0.312) (0.284) (0.313) (0.313) (0.347)
% Correct
A l l 8 38 68 38 68 48 7
In=1 73 80 73 80 88 81
In=0 89 89 89 90 78 90
Chi-Square 253 289 252 288 223 259
Fixed Eff. No yes No Yes No Yes
N
c 480 480 480 480 420 420
a * and  ** represent statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
  
b Specifications 7, 8, 9, and 10 reflect all tenders except tenders 1 and 2.  Specifications 11 and
12 do not include tenders 1 and 2, and 4, 6, and 16 due to the fact that winning bids were not
available for tenders 3, 5 and 15, and tenders1 and 2 due to the lags on the learning variables.